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Constitutional Law
By David E. Hudson*

As in years past, the bulk of the Georgia appellate court decisions in the
area of constitutional law concerned the criminal law aspects of the
Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments and the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. A significant although
lesser number of constitutional decisions involved civil matters and will
also be discussed in this survey.
I.

A.

FOURTH AMENDMENT

Standing to Claim Protection

The courts decided several cases which turned on the standing of an
individual to assert the protection of the Fourth Amendment. In Epps v.
State' the defendant could not complain of the search of a hole in the
middle of a field where the defendant was "neither the owner, tenant upon,
invitee upon or . . . present at . . . the premises." But the rule of Jones
v. United States,2 holding that those legitimately on the premises may
challenge a search, was applied in Bramblett v. State,' and a defendant
was allowed to challenge a search that occurred when he was on the premises of a co-defendant. A different panel of the court held, however, that a
passenger in another's automobile could not object to a search of the vehicle.' More consistent was the decision in Mahar v. State,5 where a defendant was held to have no standing to object to the seizure of evidence left
in a stolen truck.
Another aspect of "standing" arose in Norman v. State6 where the denial
of a motion to suppress was reversed when the Court of Appeals held that
a truck loaded with moonshine was within the "curtilage." The truck was
in a meadow within 200 feet of defendant's house and 100 feet of his barn.
* Partner, Hull, Towill, Norman, Barrett & Johnson, Augusta, Georgia. Mercer University
(A.B. 1968); Harvard Law School (J.D. 1971); Law Clerk to Hon. Griffin B. Bell, U.S. Court
of Appeals (1971-72); Senior Law Instructor, U.S. Military Police School, Ft. Gordon, Georgia
(1972-74).

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

134 Ga.App. 429, 430; 214 S.E.2d 703, 706 (1975).
362 U.S. 257 (1960).
135 Ga.App. 770, 219 S.E.2d 26 (1975).
Mitchell v. State 136 Ga.App. 390, 221 S.E.2d 465 (1975).
137 Ga.App. 116, 223 S.E.2d 204 (1975).
134 Ga.App. 767, 216 S.E.2d 644 (1975).
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Consent to Searches

A finding that a search was conducted by consent is one way to resolve
Fourth Amendment disputes without entering the thicket of warrants and
probable cause. During this survey period the supreme court held that
consent to a search or to seizure of evidence could be given by a brother
or by the former husband of a defendant's sister who had custody of the
premises when the police arrived.8
Consent to search was found to have been voluntarily given in cases
where as many as 11 police officers "were in and about the house," 9 and
where the police were armed when they asked for consent. 0
C.

Technical Sufficiency of Search Warrants

Several cases illustrate that Georgia courts will exclude evidence taken
under warrant when a technical deficiency exists in the warrant or its
issuance. The affidavit supporting a warrant must be signed." Evidence
not in the affidavit but presented orally to the magistrate must be given
under oath in order to be considered in determining probable cause to issue
a warrant.' 2 The issuing magistrate must make the probable-cause determination and cannot merely rely on the expertise of the law enforcement
officer."' The magistrate at a motion-to-suppress hearing is not required to
be able to give a detailed account of what he considered at the time he
made the probable-cause determination, if he in fact remembers considering the affidavit."
The language used in search warrants can be critical. A warrant to
search "all persons" on the premises of a public lounge is a general warrant
and invalid.' 5 A warrant must also describe the place to be searched with
such sufficiency that the executing officer has no discretion to search any
other place. A warrant for a "green house at the southesast corner of
College and Gordon streets" was held to be too indefinite when no such
house was on the southeast comer and more than one green building stood
on other corners of the intersection.'6
7. Moye v. Hopper, 234 Ga.App. 230, 214 S.E.2d 920 (1975).
8. Barrow v. State, 235 Ga. 635, 221 S.E.2d 416 (1975).
9. Code v. State, 234 Ga. 90, 93, 214 S.E,2d 873, 875 (1975).
10. Hall v. State, 135 Ga.App. 690, 218 S.E.2d 687 (1975). A closer case existed in Jefferson v. State, 136 Ga.App. 63, 220 S.E.2d 71 (1975), where a valid consent was found even
though the police stated they would go get a warrant and that "it might involve defendant's
wife and child."
11. State v. Barnett, 136 Ga.App. 122, 220 S.E.2d 730 (1975).
12. Riggins v. State, 136 Ga.App. 279, 220 S.E.2d 775 (1975), where testimony was not
under oath. But cf., Dailey v. State, 136 Ga.App. 866, 222 S.E.2d 682 (1976), where testimony
was under oath.
13. Page v. State, 135 Ga.App. 807, 222 S.E.2d 661 (1975).
14. Cowart v. State, 134 Ga.App. 757, 216 S.E.2d 350 (1975).
15. Wilson v. State, 136 Ga.App. 70, 221 S.E.2d 62 (1975).
16. Durrett v. State, 136 Ga.App. 114, 220 S.E.2d 92 (1975).
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However, it is not error for a warrant to fail to specifically describe the
person to be searched if the place is sufficiently described and no person
is searched. Applying Georgia Code §27-303, the court of appeals held that
a warrant must particularly describe only the person or the place to be
searched." It is not error if a warrant names several persons living at an
address, when, in fact, only one of the named persons resides there.'8 The
court of appeals also decided that a photocopy of a warrant is sufficient
for service. 'I
D.

Probable Cause to Issue a Warrant or Institute a Search

Probable Cause Based on Information From an Informer
Numerous cases challenged probable-cause determinations made totally
or in part upon affidavits reciting hearsay information obtained from informers. These cases all refer to Aguilar v. Texas 0 for the proper legal
standard by which to evaluate the affidavits. Aguilar imposes two requirements: that the affidavit disclose circumstances upon which to determine
(1) the credibility of the informer, and (2) the reliability of his information.
The second requirement may be satisfied by disclosure of how the informer
got his information or by disclosure of information so detailed that the
magistrate can determine that the informer's statement is more than an
unsubstantiated rumor.2'
In State v. Perry,2 the supreme court reversed the court of appeals and
held that an informer should have been considered reliable after he had
on four prior occasions given information on which drugs had been confiscated and after the police actually confirmed part of the informer's tip
before conducting a warrantless search. Also supportive of the informant's
reliability was the fact that the police knew the accused person had previously possessed illegal drugs. In another case, Burkhill v. State,2 3 it was
correctly held that the informer need not have a history of prior accuracy
but that the informer's reliability could be sufficiently established by information so detailed as to support a conclusion of credibility.
The second prong of the Aguilar test seems to create more reversals. In
Mitchell v. State,'2 a reliable informer stated that a person in a tan outfit
would register at the Marriott Hotel on that day and would be carrying
luggage containing heroin. This information obviously did not reveal how
the informer got his information. If the second prong of Aguilar was to be
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Holloway v. State, 134 Ga.App. 498, 215 S.E.2d 262 (1975).
Perry v. State, 134 Ga.App. 874, 216 S.E.2d 691 (1975).
DeFreeze v. State, 136 Ga.App. 10, 220 S.E.2d 17 (1975).
378 U.S. 108 (1964).
Sams v. The State, 121 Ga. App. 46, 172 S.E.2d 473 (1970).
234 Ga. 842, 218 S.E.2d 559 (1975).
135 Ga.App. 595, 218 S.E.2d 453 (1975).
136 Ga.App. 2,220 S.E.2d 34 (1975).
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satisfied, it had to be because the information was detailed enough to take
the matter out of the realm of rumor or general reputation.' In Mitchell,
the court held that it was not. Mitchell was distinguished from the leading
case of Draperv. United States, 6 where the informer also told of the arrival
of a person carrying luggage containing drugs. The information not only
was more detailed in Draper, the court said, but also was given on the day
prior to the search; in Mitchell the informer gave the tip on the day of the
search and could have based his statement on nothing more than a sighting
that day.
In Mahar v. State," an informer stated his belief that a stolen television
set was located in a certain apartment. Lacking detail or an explanation
of how the information was obtained, the affidavit was held insufficient to
establish probable cause. McGuire v. State" and Fenning v. State29 are
other cases where reliable informers gave information about the coming
and going of drug-users from given locations but with insufficient detail
to give probable cause to believe that contraband or illegal activity would
be presently found on the premises.
Also important in the decision to issue a warrant based on an informer's
statement is whether the information is current or stale. Frequently an
affidavit will be worded in the present tense-for example, "drugs are
being sold." In such an instance, the courts require that the affidavit or
the sworn testimony to the magistrate provide "other circumstances" to
support the conclusion that the report is current. An absence of other
circumstances on which to base a finding of current information caused
searches to be invalidated in Cochran v. State3 and McGuire v. State.3 '
But in Logan v. State,32 the evidence supporting probable cause to believe
that a lottery was being operated from a certain address was confirmed by
the police for several months and up until the day before the warrant was
obtained. The information was not stale. Likewise in Walker v. State, 33 the
police confirmed aspects of the informer's tip on the day before obtaining
the warrant.
An important point bearing upon the assessment to be made of the
probable-cause evidence was made in McFarlandv. State.34 In considering
evidence that a gambling operation was being run from a country club, the
court of appeals held that probable cause could exist even though the
evidence "may have shown innocent" as well as illegal activity. Probable
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
358 U.S. 307 (1959).
137 Ga. App. 116, 223 S.E.2d 204 (1975).
136 Ga.App. 271, 220 S.E.2d 769 (1975). (1959).
136 Ga.App. 569, 222 S.E.2d 122 (1975).
136 Ga.App. 94, 220 S.E.2d 83 (1975).
136 Ga.App. 271, 220 S.E.2d 769 (1975).
135 Ga.App. 879, 219 S.E.2d 615 (1975).
136 Ga.App. 857, 222 S.E.2d 676 (1975).
137 Ga.App. 354, 223 S.E.2d 739 (1976).
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cause exists if there is a "reasonable certainty" that the activity was in fact
criminal.
One other important case in this area is Smith v. State, " which involved
a warrant issued on double hearsay. The police officer gave an affidavit
setting forth what informant A had learned from informant B. The court
of appeals held that double hearsay can be sufficient to support the issuance of a warrant when four factors exist: (1) The police officer affiant
must give circumstances to support the conclusion that informant A is
credible; (2) He must give a basis for determining that A's information is
reliable; (3) The magistrate must be apprised of the circumstances underlying A's determination that B's information was reliable; (4) The affidavit
must disclose the basis for the determination by both A and B that the
contraband was located where they said it was."'
Probable Cause Determinations in Other Contexts
Probable cause to believe that individuals are involved in drug trafficking does not necessarily mean that there is probable cause to believe that
drugs are to be found on certain premises. Probable cause must extend to
a place and not just to a person if the place is to be searched. 7
However, in two cases, probable cause to search persons was established
as police officers were in the process of searching a place or other persons.
While, pursuant to a warrant, the police were making a search of a house
used to conduct a lottery, they were justified in searching ten persons who
entered the house and who were found to have lottery tickets and money
3
from the sale thereof."' In Lentile v. State,'
police arrested a suspect in
the yard of a house for drug violations. Immediately other persons in the
house from which the arrestee had just come with the drugs began to flee.
The court of appeals held that the police officers had probable cause to
enter the house to arrest and search the other persons.
E.

Probable Cause to Arrest or Detain

Automobile Cases
Numerous factual situations have been found to justify the stopping of
an automobile and the arrest of its driver and sometimes the arrest of other
occupants. In most of the reported cases, evidence is discovered in plain
view once the vehicle is stopped. A fast-moving pick-up truck, skidding in
the roadway, justified pursuit and arrest in Davis v. State."'
35. 136 Ga.App. 17, 220 S.E.2d 11 (1975).
36. The court relied on United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971) to avoid the strict
application of the two Aguilar tests to the second informant, B.
37. Bush v. State, 134 Ga.App. 489, 215 S.E.2d 26 (1975).
38. Logan v. State, 135 Ga.App. 879, 219 S.E.2d 615 (1975).
39. 136 Ga.App. 611, 222 S.E.2d 86 (1975).
40. 135 Ga.App. 931, 219 S.E.2d 598 (1975).
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In Cook v. State,4 police officers saw what they believed to be a drug
transaction taking place. When they approached, the participants jumped
into a car and sped off. The police gave chase and, when they stopped the
vehicle, saw cellophane bags on the floor and smelled marijuana. "Flight
in connection with [these] other circumstances" was sufficient probable
cause. In Ward v. State," erratic driving in a drunken fashion was found
sufficient to authorize the stopping of a car and, when marijuana was
smelled, the arrest of the driver. A contrary result was reached in State v.
Smith, 43 where the police had no reason to be suspicious other than the fact
that defendants were sitting in a parked car filled with smoke.
WarrantlessArrests
Spotting defendants in a stolen car after having received a tip that one
defendant had bragged about "hot cars" gave probable cause to arrest all
the occupants of the car in Coley v. State.4 The mobility of the car justified
an arrest to prevent escape and a failure of justice.
A tougher situation faced a divided court of appeals in Eagerton v.
Statel' and led to a 5-4 division. After receiving a tip two or three days
earlier that drugs would be flown in on Sunday, police staked out a small
airport. A state trooper patrolling in the area was asked to observe one exit
road. The suspect flew in and then transferred to a car. The trooper was
alerted and stopped the car for a -routine check of licenses. The trooper
arrested the suspect for an expired tag, and then drugs in plain view were
observed. The majority held that not only did the trooper have the right
to make a routine stop, but he also had probable cause to search based on
information received from the city police. A strong dissent contended that
the tip received earlier in the week had not met requirements for reliability
and also asserted that the police had two days in which to obtain a warrant
for the search and did not. The routine stop of the car and the plain-view
discovery of drugs therein are criticized as having been purposefully accomplished to search for drugs."'
F.

Inventory and Impoundment of Automobiles

The U.S. Supreme Court significantly clarified this area of Fourth
41, 136 Ga.App. 908, 222 S.E.2d 656 (1975).
42. 137 Ga.App. 462, 224 S.E.2d 96 (1976).
43. 137 Ga.App. 101, 223 S.E.2d 30 (1975).
44. 135 Ga.App. 810, 219 S.E.2d 35 (1975).
45. 134 Ga.App. 637, 215 S.E.2d 479 (1975).
46. The dissent appears to undercut itself when it argues that the informer's tip was not
sufficiently supported but that a warrant should nonetheless have been obtained. Probable
cause to search probably did not exist until the tip was confirmed by the defendant's arrival
in the fashion explained by the informant. Id.

19761

CONSTITUTIONAL LA W

Amendment law in the recent case of South Dakota v. Opperman,"'where
the Court upheld the routine inventory of a car impounded for illegal
parking. This holding was limited to vehicles that either impede traffic or
threaten safety.
Georgia decisions rendered prior to Opperman are entirely consistent
with it and reflect an accurate analysis that has existed for some time. In
Jefferson v. State,4 the defendant was arrested for a traffic offense and fled
from the car leaving it in the street with the keys in it. The car was properly
impounded, and contraband found during an inventory of its contents was
admissible.
In State v. McCranie," the court of appeals held an impoundment
invalid where the defendant was not arrested for a traffic offense, the car
from which defendant was taken was on private property belonging to
defendant, and could have been left there with no danger to the public or
the security of the car.
G.

Plain View Searches

Many cases during the survey period were decided on the basis of "plain
view." Plain view after a traffic arrest justifies seizure of contraband. 50
Officers lawfully in a house making an arrest may search the house to
''secure" it-to locate persons or to prevent the possibility of personal
harm or destruction of evidence. Contraband in plain view throughout the
house may be seized, but a search for contraband is impermissible.51
Often police officers in lawfully executing search warrants will discover
evidence of crimes other than those specified in the warrant. Such evidence
is admissible under the plain-view rule. In Pope v. State,"' officers lawfully
found marijuana in a place they were searching for gambling devices. In
Harp v. State,'13 officers found burglary tools in plain view while they were
executing a search warrant for gambling devices. 4
47.

44 U.S.L.W. 5294 (U.S. Jul. 6, 1976).

48. 136 Ga.App. 63, 220 S.E.2d 71 (1975).
49. 137 Ga.App. 369, 223 S.E.2d 765 (1976).
50. Eagerton v. State, 134 Ga.App. 637, 215 S.B.2d 479 (1975); Ward v. State, 137
Ga.App. 462, 224 S.E.2d 96 (1976).
51. Lentile v. State, 136 Ga.App. 611, 222 S.E.2d 86 (1975).
52. 134 Ga.App. 455, 214 S.E.2d 686 (1975).
53. 136 Ga.App. 897, 222 S.E.2d 623 (1975).
54. One limitation on plain view seizure is the "mere evidence" rule of Warden v. Hayden,
387 U.S. 294 (1967). While contraband may be seized, mere evidence may not unless the
police have probable cause to believe that the items may aid in an apprehension or conviction.
The rule was recently applied in Anderson v. Maryland, - U.S. -. , 96 S.Ct. 2737 (1976),
where investigators executed a warrant against an attorney and seized documents in plain
view which related to activities other than the crime described in the warrant. The seizure
was lawful, the Court held, because the investigators could reasonably have believed that the
additional documents were related and could be used to prove the attorney's criminal intent.
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Plain view, however, does not always sustain a seizure. Cook v. State"'
involved a coin dealer who called the police when he became suspicious of
a stranger offering to sell a collection. While the coins were in fact stolen
and the police saw them in plain view when they lawfully entered the
premises at the request of the owner, it was not "immediately apparent"
to the officer that the coins were contraband and he had no right to seize
the collection.
H.

The Exclusionary Rule

The exclusionary rule has taken severe beatings on many fronts in recent
months. In each instance the court dealing with the question has recognized that the purpose of the rule is to deter unlawful police activity and
has refused to apply the rule when that purpose is not served. In Georgia,
the supreme court held that a search of a pupil by a public-school administrator was governmental action and governed by the Fourth Amendment.
The exclusionary rule, however, applies only to law enforcement governmental personnel and not to school officials. Moreover, the search based
on reasonable suspicion was not unreasonable in the context of the educational environment and the reduced expectation of privacy by a minor. 6
The U.S. Supreme Court also kept the rule in check by refusing to
exclude illegally seized evidence in a civil proceeding instituted by the
federal government where the evidence had been seized by a state government.57 The Court also held that search-and-seizure claims considered by
state courts could not be reviewed in a federal habeas corpus proceeding.
It was not persuaded that another review on habeas corpus added any
incentive against violation of the Fourth Amendment by police officers. 8
Georgia did hold that the exclusionary rule applies to illegally seized
evidence sought to be admitted in a probation revocation proceeding.5 9 On
the other hand, a failure to comply with inventory requirements of Georgia
Code §§27-302, -310 and §§58-727, -728 is not a sufficient ground to exclude properly seized contraband whiskey." Likewise, a failure to conduct
a commitment hearing within 48 hours as required by Georgia Code §27212 does not require exclusion of evidence.6'
55. 134 Ga. App. 712, 215 S.E.2d 728 (1975).
56. State v. Young, 234 Ga. 488, 216 S.E.2d 586 (1975). Followed by the court of appeals
in The State v. Lamb, 137 Ga.App. 437, 224 S.E.2d 51 (1976), where it was held that the fruits
of searches and seizures by college officials were not to be excluded in a criminal proceeding.
Searches by private individuals also are exempt from the exclusionary rule as well as the
Fourth Amendment. Tootle v. State, 135 Ga.App. 840, 219 S.E.2d 492 (1975).
57. United States v. Janis, 44 U.S.L.W. 5303 (U.S. July 6, 1976).
58. Stone v. Powell, 44 U.S.L.W. 5313 (U.S. July 6, 1976).
59. Amiss v. State, 135 Ga.App. 784, 219 S.E.2d 28 (1975).
60. Holloway v. State, 134 Ga.App. 498, 215 S.E.2d 262 (1975).
61. Sanders v. State, 235 Ga. 425, 440, 219 S.E.2d 768 (1975).
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I. Electronic Surveillance
Wiretapping is a form of search and seizure which must be accomplished
in compliance with the Fourth Amendment and state and federal statutes.
2
Orkin v. State"
dealt with many facets of this subject. In Orkin, a police
undercover agent recorded two face-to-face conversations and two telephone conversations with a co-defendant who was trying to arrange a killing for hire. These recordings were made without a warrant but were later
used to establish probable cause and to obtain a wiretap warrant from the
superior court. The court held that the recordings made without a warrant
were lawful under both statutory and decisional exceptions for conversations where one of the parties thereto (here the undercover agent) consents
63
to the recording.
The court also upheld the recordings made pursuant to the warrant
against charges that the warrant did not particularly describe the communications to be intercepted"4 and that the warrant did not specify the name
of William Orkin as a person whose conversations would be monitored.-5
In addition, the court decided that use of the recordings prior to trial to
test amplification in the courtroom and for voice identification by a witness did not violate Georgia Code §26-3004(k).11

II.

FIFTH AMENDMENT

A.

Self-Incrimination

Miranda Warnings
During this survey period no case was reversed for a failure to apply
62. 236 Ga. 176, 223 S.E.2d 61 (1976).
63. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971); 18 U.S.C. A. §2511 (2)(c) (1969); GA.
CODE ANN. §26-3006 (1972).
64. The warrant specified the crimes, authorized surveillance of a named suspect relative
to those crimes, specified the particular telephone number for a wiretap, prohibited unauthorized interception or recording, and incorporated the application which specified the conversations to be monitored as those of the suspect with unnamed other persons relative to those
crimes specified. 236 Ga. at 185, 223 S.E.2d at 70, interpreting 18 U.S.C.A. §2518 (4)(c)
(1969).
65. 18 U.S.C.A. §§2518 (1)(b)(iv) and (4)(a) (1969) have been interpreted to require
naming in the warrant those persons against whom there is probable cause to believe that
they are involved in the crime and will be using the monitored phone. In Orkin, the prosecuting attorney forthrightly revealed to the issuing judge all evidence which might have implicated any party, including Orkin. The issuing judge decided that there was sufficient evidence to support a warrant for electronic surveillance against Bowen, a co-defendant, but not
against Orkin since Bowen's information was unverified. The supreme court found the evidence insufficient to establish probable cause against Orkin at the time of application; however, his conversations, which were later recorded along with those of co-defendant B )wen
who was named in the warrant, were admissible.
66. A code provision that makes unnecessary use of recordings an invasion of privacy and
grounds for excluding the recordings.
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Miranda, and the courts decided that in several situations the warnings
were not required at all. In Shy v. State, 7 a police officer came to the scene
of a shooting and forced a suspect to lie on the ground for a frisk. While
searching the gunman, the officer asked what was going on and the prone
gunman answered, "I caught my wife and that son of a bitch and I shot
him." The court reasoned that even though the gunman was in custody,
the officer's preliminary question did not intend to probe for evidence and
was an attempt to assess the immediate situation; Miranda did not apply.
The Supreme Court also limited the spread of Miranda in the case of
United States v. Mandujano, holding that warnings need not be given to
a grand jury witness. While such a witness retains his right against selfincrimination, the grand jury room does not equal the hostile setting of a
police station to the extent that warnings are required.
The point at which warnings are required when police interrogation
takes place was debated in Ingram v. State." The court held that warnings
were not required when Ingram was asked to go to the police station for
interrogation about the activities of a third person. Only when, in the
course of questioning, Ingram himself became a suspect were warnings
required; and those warnings were given. It was also held in Ingram that
Miranda warnings need not include advice that the suspect could stop the
questioning at any time and request counsel.
Voluntariness of Confessions
Even when warnings are properly given and a confession voluntarily
made, there may still be a challenge that the defendant was mentally
incapable of volunteering or that his volition was the product of coercion.
In Goodwin v. State, 0 the trial judge ruled that the defendant was mentally capable of waiving his rights and volunteering a confession. The
evidence in conflict was whether the 18-year-old defendant had an I.Q. of
a nine-year-old or whether his intelligence was just a few points below
normal. The supreme court found that this was sufficient evidence to
support the trial court's ruling. It was also held that incarceration of this
youth for just over a day with no evidence of mistreatment did not constitute coercion. 7'
Disclosure at Trial of Defendant's Choice to Remain Silent
The Georgia decisions in this area must be viewed in light of Doyle v.
Ohio,7" which held that silence following Miranda warnings is "insolubly
67. 234 Ga. 816, 218 S.E.2d 599 (1975).
68. 44 U.S.L.W. 4629 (U.S. May 19, 1976).
69. 134 Ga.App. 935, 216 S.E.2d 608 (1975).
70. 236 Ga. 339, 223 S.E.2d 703 (1976).
71. Compare with Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961), where a retarded youth was confined
for a week prior to confessing and was during that time ill and mistreated.
72. 44 U.S.L.W. 4902 (U.S. Jun. 17, 1976).

19761

CONSTITUTIONAL LA W

ambiguous" and cannot be used for impeachment purposes at trial. In
Johnson v. State," the Georgia Supreme Court permitted the prosecution
to impeach a defendant's alibi testimony by establishing that the defendant did not give his alibi to the police when he was arrested. The court
pointed out that there was no contention that defendant had "remained
silent" when arrested.
The result in Johnson is hard to reconcile with the subsequent Doyle
decision. In Doyle, it appears that the defendant did not remain totally
silent either; 4 he simply did not disclose his claim of a frame-up at the
time of arrest. The fact is that in Johnson, like Doyle, the prosecution
attempted to strengthen its case by disclosing that the defendant had
failed to offer his explanation at the time of arrest.
Another case to be considered in light of Doyle is Howard v. State,"'
where the defendant, while in custody, was pointed out by his victim and
did not at that time deny the accusation. The trial judge charged that
under Georgia Code §38-409 silence may amount to an admission. The
court of appeals found the circumstances to justify the charge on the basis
that no Miranda warnings had been given. This, however, may be a weak
distinction after Doyle because it would mean that silence is "ambiguous"
only after the police have warned a suspect of the right to remain silent.
Is silence any less ambiguous for the suspect exercising his right to remain
silent based on his own knowledge?
6
is another case in which the prosecution cross-examined
Lowe v. State"
the defendant to bring out the fact that an alibi had not been disclosed at
the time of arrest. The court recognized the ambiguity of silence and held
the cross-examination to be error in view of the lack of evidence that
defendant had consented to police interrogation. It may be that the Supreme Court will in time amplify the Doyle decision to make it clear
whether the right not to have silence disclosed depends on police interrogation or if the right can be lost by responding in part to police interrogation
at the time of arrest." Until such time, the foregoing Georgia cases must
be viewed with some uncertainty.
A related matter concerns charges by the trial court explaining the right
to remain silent when no such charge is requested by the defense. Defendants have alleged that unnecessary attention is thereby drawn to the
exercise of the right to remain silent. Stapleton v. State"' upheld such a
charge.
73. 235 Ga. 355, 219 S.E.2d 430 (1975). The opinion does not state whether Miranda
warnings were given upon arrest.
74. 44 U.S.L.W. 4902, 4903 n.5 (U.S. June 17, 1976).
75. 137 Ga.App. 352, 223 S.E.2d 745 (1976).
76. 136 Ga.App. 631, 222 S.E.2d 50 (1975).
77. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), does allow cross-examination based on
inconsistent statements given upon arrest regardless of compliance with Miranda.
78. 235 Ga. 513, 220 S.E.2d 269 (1975).
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A similar problem arose in Shy v. State," where the defense brought
out that a prosecution witness refused to talk to police without first consulting counsel. In turn, the prosecution established, without objection,
that the defendant had likewise asked for counsel. The court held that
under the circumstances of the case no implication of guilt could be drawn
from defendant's assertion of this constitutional right. The most likely inference to the jury on the extant facts was that insistence on the right to
counsel was irrelevant to the truthfulness of testimony or the guilt of the
defendant. Another important ruling was made in Brown v. State. ° There
it was decided that a defendant's exercise of the right to remain silent
during the guilt or innocence phase of the trial did not preclude his testimony on the merits during the sentencing phase.
Appellate Review of Self-Incrimination Determinations
The supreme court held in Stapleton v. State8 that on appellate review,
voluntariness of confessions and compliance with Miranda would be determined from evidence given during the Jackson v. Denno 2 hearing and from
any other evidence in the record from any stage of the trial. 3
B.

Double Jeopardy

In Georgia, double jeopardy has been given statutory application greater
than provided in either the state or U.S. Constitution. Marchman v.
State" illustrates the point. A defendant was charged with stealing a
Narvo aircraft radio. The conviction was reversed because the proof
showed that the radio was a Narco. The defendant was reindicted and
convicted of stealing a Narco.
On appeal, the supreme court found the second trial to be barred by the
double jeopardy provisions of Georgia Code §26-507(d) which prohibits
retrial after a successful appeal where the first conviction is reversed on
"a finding that the evidence did not authorize the verdict." A strong dissent referred to the legislative history of this statute and concluded that
79. 234 Ga. 816, 218 S.E.2d 599 (1975).
80. 235 Ga. 644, 220 S.E.2d 922 (1975).
81. 235 Ga. 513, 220 S.E.2d 269 (1975).
82. 378 U.S. 368 (1963).
83. During its recent term, the U.S. Supreme Court rendered several decisions which will
bear upon the success with which the privilege against self-incrimination is asserted in Georgia and elsewhere. Andresen v. Maryland,
- U.S.
-, 96 S.Ct. 2737 (1976), holds that
the privilege does not extend to business papers obtained by a search warrant as opposed to
subpoena. The defendant in such a situation is not required to say or do anything. In Garner
v. United States, 44 U.S.L.W. 4323 (U.S. Mar. 23, 1976), the privilege was held not to apply
to income tax returns used in a gambling prosecution where the incriminating material was
submitted on the return. The Court held that defendant had the choice to assert the privilege
when the returns were filed but not thereafter.
84. 234 Ga. 40, 215 S.E.2d 467 (1975) (three justices dissenting).
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the quoted language should be construed to bar retrial only where there
has been an adjudication of not guilty in the first trial or appeal.
In other contexts, our courts held that the habitual-violator statute ' for
motor vehicle drivers does not impose double jeopardy,8 and that the
imposition of a criminal conviction and administrative punishment for
prison escape does not constitute double jeopardy.87 Also, the supreme
court reversed a case in which the trial judge imposed a greater sentence
than had been previously imposed prior to a successful habeas corpus
attack." The court held that while the trial judge was not barred from
imposing a more severe sentence, he was required to show affirmatively in
the record why he did so.89
III.

A.

SIXTH AMENDMENT

Speedy Trial

During the survey period, the right to a speedy trial was discussed only
0 A delay of five
in Harris v. Hopper.1
months from indictment to trial
without a showing of the reason for the delay, without insistence by defendant or his counsel for trial to take place, and without a showing of
prejudice, did not amount to a constitutional violation. In any event, the
court determined that the defendant had waived his right to claim a
speedy trial violation by pleading guilty.
B.

ImpartialJury

In a series of cases, the Georgia courts have rejected claims that the
under-representation of young adults9 and black females"2 shows exclusion
and discrimination against identifiably separate groups. The supreme
court also upheld the Georgia statute which exempts women from jury
3
duty merely upon their own request.
In Julian v. State,"4 the defense successfully established that the jury
85. GA. CODE ANN. §§92A-455 and -463 (Supp. 1975).
86. Johnston v. State, 236 Ga. 370, 223 S.E.2d 808 (1976).
87. Middlebrook v. Allen, 234 Ga. 481, 216 S.E.2d 331 (1975).
88. Anthony v. Hopper 235 Ga. 336, 219 S.E.2d 413 (1975).
89. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
90. 236 Ga. 389, 224 S.E.2d 1 (1976).
91. Mosley v. Hopper, 234 Ga. 122, 214 S.E.2d 654 (1975); Orkin v. State, 236 Ga. 126,
223 S.E.2d 61 (1976); Gibson v. State, 236 Ga. 874, 226 S.E.2d 63 (1976).
92. Sanders v. State, 235 Ga. 425, 219 S.E.2d 768 (1975). Gibson v. State, 236 Ga. 874,
226 S.E.2d 63 (1976), also rejected claims that the jury panel excluded poor people and new
residents of the county.

93. Zirkle v. State, 235 Ga. 289, 219 S.E.2d 389 (1975). Additionally, the code provision
giving women an exemption from jury duty has been repealed by Ga. Laws, 1975, p. 779, GA.
CODE ANN. §59-112 (Supp. 1976).
94.

134 Ga.App. 592, 215 S.E.2d 496 (1975).
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pool overrepresented (93%) white males with an average age of 69 years.
The court of appeals held that the predominance of such a group made the
selection of a "fairly representative" jury almost impossible. But in
Sanders v. State, 5 challenges to the jury alleging discrimination against
blacks and females failed. In Sanders, it was established that the jury
selection process ws not discriminatory. Moreover, the evidence was
otherwise too imprecise to show a substantial discrepancy between the
number of eligible blacks and women and the number actually selected for
jury service.
C. Right to Jury Trial
The supreme court held that the habitual-violator statute for motorvehicle operators does not deny any right to a jury trial."6
D.

The Right to be Informed of Charges

In Georgia, although a person arrested under a warrant must be given a
commitment hearing within 72 hours of arrest,97 denial of such a hearing
establishes no grounds for relief after trial and conviction, entering a plea
of guilty, or any other termination of pre-trial detention. It is noteworthy
that even a guilty plea without a prior and full explanation of the charges
is invalid."
E.

The Right to Confront and Cross-Examine Witnesses

In Lingerfelt v. State,'" it was held that when a prosecution witness
would not answer questions posed by the prosecutor, it was error for the
prosecutor to ask leading questions posing the substance of testimony
given by the witness at a prior hearing. The effect of such questions was
to put the prior testimony before the jury in a form that could not be crossexamined by the defendant.
In Orkin v. State,' the supreme court again upheld the admission of
testimony by investigatory officers as to implicating statements made to
the officers by one of the co-conspirators against another. When the statements are made in the furtherance of the conspiracy and there is independent evidence both as to the existence of the conspiracy and the involvement of the defendant therein, there is no constitutional deprivation
if the implicated party is given no opportunity to cross-examine his comrade who made the statements in the presence of the police.
95.
96.

235 Ga. 425, 219 S.E.2d 768 (1975).
Johnston v. State, 236 Ga. 370, 223 S.E.2d 808 (1976). See note 85, supra.
97. GA. ConE ANN. §27-210 (1972).
98. McClure v. Hopper, 234 Ga. 45, 214 S.E.2d 503 (1975).
99. Henderson v. Morgan, 44 U.S.L.W. 4910 (U.S. June 17, 1976).
100. 235 Ga. 139, 218 S.E.2d 752 (1975).
101. 236 Ga. 176, 223 S.E.2d 61 (1976).
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Closely related is the matter of the severance of the trials of codefendants. In a conspiracy trial, the acts and sayings of all co-conspirators
in furtherance of the general criminal scheme are admissible against each
other.' 2 Under such circumstances, there was no abuse of discretion in
denying a severance in Orkin. The standards which govern the granting of
severances were discussed in Cain v. State.'°3 The criteria include the
likelihood of prejudice or confusion, antagonistic defenses, the danger of
evidence against one defendant being improperly considered against another, and the ability to obtain testimony from a co-defendant.
F.

Assistance of Counsel

The right to counsel does not obtain for traffic offenses if, as a practical
matter, prison sentences are not imposed for the offense in question.' 4 The
right to counsel is available for juvenile offenders and may not be waived
by a parent whose interests are adverse to that of the juvenile.'0 5
In a civil proceeding where a witness fears that his answers may be
incriminating, the witness may assert the right to remain silent, but he is
not entitled to have the advice of counsel on a question-by-question
06
basis.'
"Effective assistance of counsel" means "counsel who is informed and
familiar with the facts of the case." Counsel appointed moments before a
guilty plea does not satisfy constitutional minimums.' 7 This is not to say,
however, that a defendant cannot waive his right to counsel at the time of
a guilty plea.' 8
State v. Houston' 9 established.in this state that the right to counsel
extends to commitment hearings. Where counsel has not been provided,
the burden is on the state to show that there was no prejudice to the
defendant; otherwise the conviction will be reversed. Sometimes the state
prevails,'10 and other times it does not."'
Appointed counsel on appeal has control over what errors will be assigned for review. There is no denial of effective assistance of counsel
if
'2
counsel refuses to pursue issues which he deems without merit."
102.

GA. CODE ANN. §38-306 (1974).

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

235 Ga. 128, 218 S.E.2d 856 (1975).
Johnston v. State, 236 Ga. 370, 223 S.E.2d 808 (1976).
134 Ga. App. 843, 216 S.E.2d 670 (1975).
Page v. Page, 235 Ga. 131, 218 S.E.2d 859 (1975).
Cannon v. State, 136 Ga.App. 379, 221 S.E.2d 239 (1975).
Petty v. State, 136 Ga.App. 930, 222 S.E.2d 658 (1975).
234 Ga. 721, 218 S.E.2d 13 (1975).
State v. Hightower, 236 Ga. 58, 222 S.E.2d 333 (1976).
Davie v. State, 136 Ga. App. 749, 222 S.E.2d 188 (1975).
Reid v. State, 235 Ga. 378, 219 S.E.2d 740 (1975).
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G. In-Court and Out-of-Court Identification
During the survey period, no conviction was invalidated because of improper identification. Confrontation indentification by a victim of a crime
was found to be without error in both Walter v. State"' and Hobbs v.
State."' In Daniels v. State,"' identification from photographs was upheld
because there was nothing to indicate impermissible suggestiveness.
In one interesting case the perpetrators of a robbery were men dressed
as females. The victims were able to identify the defendants only from
photographs showing the men while they were dressed as women. No violation of the defendants' rights was found to have been caused by admission
of this evidence." 6
Voice identification of a suspect by a rape victim prior to arrest was
upheld in Evans v. State."7 The defendant's claim that counsel should
have been present at the time of identification was held to be without
merit.
In Waller v. State,"' a lineup case, the fact that the identifying witness
knew one of the five persons in the lineup did not make the procedure
unfair. Waller also held that identification was not impermissibly enhanced by the fact that the defendant was in the courtroom during the
motion-to-suppress hearing.
In Lowe v. State,"9 the witness was unable to identify the defendant
prior to the preliminary hearing. Defendant contended that identification
at the hearing was tainted by the witness's assumption that the assailant
would be present in court. The court of appeals rejected this contention,
since there was no authority holding that exclusively in-court identification is unduly suggestive.
IV.

EIGHTH AMENDMENT

The upholding of the Georgia death penalty statute by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Gregg v. Georgia20 is due in no small part to the prudent interpretation of Georgia Code §27-2534.1 by the Supreme Court of Georgia. The
Supreme Court relied on several decisions of our highest court to uphold
portions of the statute against charges of vagueness, and in other instances
to show that constitutionally defective provisions had already been rejected by Georgia.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

134 Ga.App. 886, 216 S.E.2d 637 (1975).
235 Ga. 8, 218 S.E.2d 769 (1975).
135 Ga.App. 549, 218 S.E.2d 274 (1975).
Lawson v. State, 234 Ga. 136, 214 S.E.2d 559 (1975).
235 Ga. 396, 219 S.E.2d 725 (1975).
134 Ga.App. 886, 716 S.E.2d 637 (1975).
136 Ga.App. 631, 222 S.E.2d 148 (1975).
44 U.S.L.W. 5230 (U.S. July 2, 1976).
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The Supreme Court noted that Jarrell v. State'2 ' had found the death
penalty to be excessive for the offense of armed robbery. Arnold v. State'22
had found Georgia Code §27-2534.1(b)(1) unconstitutionally vague in allowing the penalty to be imposed on persons with a "substantial" history
of "serious" assaultive convictions. In Jarrell, our court also took a restrictive view of Georgia Code §27-2534.1(b)(3) and held that a kidnaping did
not present a risk of death to more than one person under the extant
circumstances.
The Supreme Court noted with approval the wide latitude given to the
defendant to present evidence at the sentencing portion of the trial.'23 Also
important to the Court was the sentence-review performed by the supreme
court. "24
V.

A.

DUE PROCESS

Pre-TrialPublicity

In both Jarrellv. State25 and Dobbs v. State, 2 6 the supreme court found
voir dire to have been sufficient to overcome any potential for prejudice
from pre-trial publicity.
B.

Burden of Proof

In a hearing on a motion to suppress evidence, the burden of proving the
lawfulness of a search and seizure remains with the state although the
defendant is at times required to go forward with the evidence.2 7 Favors
v. State2 1 concerned a charge that "justification" would be a defense to
an assault if justification appeared by a "preponderance of the evidence."
This, the court held, did not place the burden of proving innocence on the
defendant.
In Avery v. State, 2 an insanity issue was found to have been improperly
excluded from the state's burden. Evidence showed that the defendant
received a blow to the head prior to committing an assault. The court
charged that if the jury believed defendant's contention that he did not
know what he was doing, it should acquit. The court of appeals held that
sanity is an element of every crime, and when the issue is raised, sanity
121.
122.
123.
124.
S.E.2d
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

234 Ga. 410, 216 S.E.2d 258 (1975).
236 Ga. 534, 224 S.E.2d 386 (1976).
Brown v. State 235 Ga. 644, 220 S.E.2d 922 (1975).
Smith v. State 236 Ga. 12, 222 S.E.2d 308 (1976); Moore v. State, 233 Ga. 861, 213
829 (1975); Coley v. State, 231 Ga. 829, 204 S.E.2d 612 (1974).
234 Ga. 410, 216 S.E.2d 258 (1975).
236 Ga. 427, 224 S.E.2d 3 (1976).
Pope v. State, 134 Ga.App. 455, 214 S.E.2d 686 (1975).
137 Ga.App. 25, 223 S.E.2d 11 (1975).
138 Ga.App. 65, 225 S.E.2d 454 (1976).
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must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. The charge given here failed to
cast that burden on the state and constituted reversible error. 30
C. Problems at Trial
Denial of a fair trial was found in Julian v. State, 3' in which a defendant
was limited to five character witnesses whose testimony occupied only 2%
of the total trial time and was then forced to present fifteen other witnesses
en masse. The handling of character witnesses in such a fashion was
deemed particularly harmful because credibility was a pivotal issue in the
trial.
D.

Sanity Determinations

In Gibbs v. State,' a defendant was found to be insane by a special jury
in 1968. Subsequently, defendant was assigned to the state mental hospital
until discharged to stand trial in 1974. At that time, defendant was entitled
to again have the issue of sanity determined in a sanity trial, since the
defendant's discharge from the hospital did not dispose of the issue.
E. Disclosure of the Identity of an Informer
The court of appeals in Taylor v. State3 3 overruled previous cases which
included fixed rules requiring disclosure of the identity of an informer
under certain circumstances. The court now follows Roviaro v. United
States,1 31 which makes disclosure a matter of discretion for the trial court.
If the informer was the one who arranged for the sale of contraband, and
if the arrangements were made away from the observations of police officers-by telephone, for example-the case for disclosure is stronger. If the
informer merely witnesses a crime that is also witnessed by police officers,
disclosure will not be required as a matter of law.
F.

Parole Revocation

Parole revocations are warranted on "slight evidence" and without a jury
determination.' 3 But in Dickerson v. State,3 6 a four-judge dissent argued
strongly that due process requires a preponderance of the evidence and
130. In reaching this decision, the court of appeals found that there there four justicea
who, either in dissent or concurrence, agreed with this analysis of insanity as an element of a
crime when the issue was before the supreme court in Grace v. Hopper, 234 Ga. 669, 217
S.E.2d 267 (1975).
131. 134 Ga.App. 592, 215 S.E.2d 496 (1975).
132. 235 Ga. 480, 220 S.E.2d 254 (1975).
133. 136 Ga. App. 31, 220 S.E.2d 49 (1975).
134. 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
135. ,Johnson v. State, 214 Ga. 818, 108 S.E.2d 313 (1959).
136. 136 Ga.App. 885, 222 S.E.2d 649 (1975).
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that the parole hearing should be delayed until after the normal disposition
of the charges (where all constitutional rights are available) if revocation
is based solely on new criminal charges.
G.

Discovery in Criminal Cases

During the survey period, the supreme court had two occasions to give
detailed attention to criminal discovery. In Jarrell v. State"7 the prosecution responded to the defendant's discovery motion by producing, among
other things, its witness list, the defendant's confession, a list of items
seized in a search and a list of physical evidence. However, the district
attorney did not turn over the state's records, proposing instead an incamera inspection. The defendant claimed that non-disclosure of the records and the admission of the testimony of witnesses whose prior statements were not furnished to the defense constituted error.
On these facts, the court reiterated that there is no rule or statute for
pre-trial discovery in Georgia. The court found that by the disclosures
which were made and the offer to allow in-camera inspection, the prosecution had complied with the decisional requirements that did exist.'3
In Rini v. State, 39 the failure to conduct, at the request of the defense,
an in-camera inspection of statements given to the police by two witnesses
was found to be error. This request was significant because it appeared
that there was contradiction between the trial testimony and other remarks made by the witnesses.
H.

Right to Appeal

A defendant who had discharged his attorneys after a motion for new
trial was filed and who had made no further request for assistance of
counsel could not complain that his case had not been appealed.4 0 A defendant who had escaped and was a fugitive on the date an appeal was due
had not been denied the right to appeal when his case was not appealed.'
I.

Disposing of Evidence Prior to Trial

When the crime lab disposed of a marijuana sample after having kept
it for three years, the defendant was not denied any constitutional right
when his trial later took place and he could not have the drug independently tested.' There, the defense had no evidence that the laboratory
137.
138.
1968).
139.
140.
141.
142.

234 Ga. 410, 216 S.E.2d 258 (1975).
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); Williams v. Dutton, 400 F.2d 797 (5th Cir.
235 Ga. 60, 218 S.E.2d 811 (1975).
234 Ga. 45, 214 S.E.2d 503 (1975).
Brown v. Ricketts, 235 Ga. 29, 218 S.E.2d 785 (1975).
Patterson v. State, 138 Ga.App. 290, 226 S.E.2d 115 (1976).
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examiner was biased or incompetent, and the defense had the opportunity
to cross-examine at trial on the methods and results of the tests.
VI.

EQUAL PROTECTION

In State
which had
brought in
''persons"

v. Gaither,' the supreme court reversed a lower court decision
upheld an equal-protection challenge to prostitution charges
Atlanta. The wording of the statute is neutral, since it refers to
who sell sex and does not distinguish between men and
women.' Consequently, it is not discriminatory for the police to enforce
the statute only against women if complaints are lodged only against
women.
VII.

CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONS IN CIVIL CASES

A.

Materialmen'sLiens

In Tucker Door & Trim Corp. v. Fifteenth St. Co., 45the Georgia materialmen's-lien statute was upheld against a due process challenge.
B.

Recall Statutes

A special act providing for recall of county commissioners for Douglas
County was upheld in Smith v. Abercrombie'46 against charges of unequal
protection, lack of uniformity, absence of malpractice in office, alteration
of terms of office, and retroactivity.
C.

Ownership of Tidal Lands

State v. Ashmore'47 held that the ownership of land between low and
high tide is in the state. Article I, §6, 1 of the Constitution of 1945 (Code
§2-601) merely ratified a 1902 act which gave private ownership rights to
the foreshore for agricultural purposes only (cultivation of oysters and
clams, for example).
D.

Post-Judgment Garnishment

In Coursin v. Harper,4 " the supreme court sustained a due-process challenge to the post-judgment aspects of the garnishment law as that law.
existed before July 1, 1975. The court emphasized the fact that the garnishment affidavit need not have been made on personal knowledge of the
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

236
GA.
235
235
236
236

Ga. 497, 224 S.E.2d 378 (1976).
CODE ANN. §26-2012 (1972).
Ga. 727, 221 S.E.2d 433 (1975).
Ga. 741, 221 S.E.2d 802 (1975).
Ga. 401, 224 S.E.2d 334 (1976).
Ga. 729, 225 S.E.2d 428 (1976).
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facts, that the writ could be issued by a clerk, and that an immediate
deprivation of funds must have occurred.
Coursin will no doubt lead to a challenge of the 1976 garnishment act,",
which allows post-judgment garnishment on an attorney's affidavit issued
by a clerk of court. The 1976 act may be distinguished because it does
require that the affiant have personal knowledge of the existence of a
judgment and because it applies only for garnishments on judgments issued by courts of this state.
E. Involuntary Removal of Child to Obtain Custody Jurisdiction
In Sanchez v. Walker County Department of Family & Children
Services, 50 a deprived-child proceeding was conducted in the Juvenile
Court of Walker County. A Georgia social worker had brought the child in
question, without parental permission, into the county from a Chattanooga, Tennessee, hospital. Since the child's legal residence was in Walker
County, the court of appeals held that the method by which the child was
brought before the court would not defeat jurisdiction.
149.
150.

GA. CODE ANN. §46-101 et seq. (Supp. (1976).

137 Ga.App. 49, 225 S.E.2d 441 (1976).

